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Review Essay

UNFROZEN CAVEMAN JUSTICE
Gary Stein*

Hugo Black: A Biography. By Roger K. Newman.** Pantheon Books. 632 pp. 1994. $30.00.
Hugo Black was one of the most enigmatic of a notably enigmatic generation of New Deal Southern Democrats that rose to
national power in the thick of this century. Lyndon Johnson had
his towering contradictions, but even those did not surpass
Black's. The same man who joined the Ku Klux Klan in his native Alabama later joined the Warren Court's rulings ordering an
end to desegregation. The same man hailed as the Supreme
Court's greatest civil libertarian wrote the Court's opinion upholding the confinement of Japanese-Americans during World
War II, one of the greatest civil liberties disasters in our history.
The same man who came to the Court to prevent the judiciary
from frustrating the will of the majority became its most ardent
defender of the rights of the minority. Oddest of all, perhaps, is
that this least trained of Supreme Court Justices, who prior to his
appointment had never held a legal post higher than that of Jefferson County (Ala.) solicitor, emerged as its dominant intellectual force and most avid student of constitutional history.
Raw ambition explains much of LBJ's incongruities.t Judicial biographies remind us that judges have ambitions, too, particularly judges who, like Black, come from a background in
electoral politics. While Roger K. Newman's new biography2 is
not rich in legal philosophy or historiography, it tells us much
about Black the man, and in the process much about Black the
* This review was prepared while the author was an associate at Paul, Weiss,
Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison in New York City.
** Research Scholar, New York University School of Law.
1. See generally, Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power
(Alfred A. Knopf, 1982); Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Means of Ascent
(Alfred A. Knopf, 1990).
2. Roger K. Newman, Hugo Black: A Biography (Pantheon Books, 1994).
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JUnst. First captivated by the raw power of Black's opinions in
1967, Newman spent a good part of the next quarter-century at
work on this biography, interviewing thousands of Black's relatives, former clerks, Alabama political associates and even, in
1969, Black himself. The result is a thoroughly informed and
highly readable study, filled with illuminating detail yet also
graced with a perspective that keeps attention focused on the
truly significant aspects of Black's fascinating life.
Newman's biography is especially timely because, in many
ways, Black is back in vogue. Though Black was a political liberal, he never shared the philosophical relativism and pragmatism that shaped the outlook of the great Northern-educated
liberal judges such as Holmes, Hand, Cardozo, and Brandeis.
Black's unusual commitment to the power of legal texts and belief in immutable principles make him seem an oak in a forest of
rootless judicial pragmatists. He is frequently invoked in that
spirit today by advocates of judicial restraint, mainly on the right,
who believe that the American tradition of judicial pragmatism
leaves too much discretion in the hands of judges.
Newman-who persuaded Congress to issue a stamp in 1986
commemorating the 100th anniversary of Black's birthJ-does
not disguise his admiration for Black. The quotation from Emerson with which Newman opens the book evinces his belief in
Black's greatness: "If a single man plant himself on his convictions and then abide, the huge world will come round to him."4
But despite his obvious affection for Black, Newman is also a
skillful, honest and at times sardonic reporter of the facts of
Black's life, which he often uses to undermine Black's claims of
conviction, and which make the Emerson epitaph seem more
than a little ironic. As a new generation debates the relative
merits of judicial formalism and judicial pragmatism, it is worth
considering the evolution of Black's jurisprudence and the
strength and significance of his convictions outside the four corners of his opinions and in the light shed by his personality, life
experiences, and aspirations.
I

"I'm just a Clay County hillbilly," Black liked to say, referring to his roots in the Alabama backcountry.s One is reminded
of the character from "Unfrozen Caveman Lawyer," the Satur3.
4.
5.

Newman, Hugo Black at 628 (cited in note 2).
Id. at ix.
Id. at 3.
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day Night Live skit from a few years back, who, awakening after
thousands of years, transforms into a wily and highly successful
American trial lawyer. "I'm just a caveman," Unfrozen
Caveman Lawyer told juries, affecting unsophisticated humility.
In neither his case nor Black's was the self-effacement warranted.
Charming, cunning, combative, and full of energy, Black
(like Unfrozen Caveman Lawyer) was a trial lawyer. Throughout his life he remained, Newman observes, "an advocate down
to his bones. "6 His formal legal education consisted of a twoyear program at the University of Alabama law school, to which
he was "apparently admitted in violation of [the school's] regulations," not having attended an undergraduate institution or taken
the necessary examinations.7 Graduating at age 20, Black went
on to become the leading personal injury lawyer in Birmingham,
Alabama, mainly representing injured workers in suits against
corporations. "The courtroom was his theater," writes Newman.
"He bluffed and gambled.... He used facial expressions-a
smirk, grimace or raised eyebrow, a tense or eager look .... He
moved around confidently and purposely," striking "a pose of
confident humility.... He tried to make jurors feel not that he
was a great showman, but that he just had a great case. "s Black
likely was the only Supreme Court Justice who took an aptitude
test that found him best suited to be an actof.9
Populism and racism made for a dangerous brew in the Birmingham of the 1920's, a working-class city known as "the Pittsburgh of the South."to At the same time Black was making his
Id. at 354.
Id. at 18, n*.
8. Id. at 55.
9. Id.
10. See Paul Hemphill, Leaving Birmingham: Notes of a Native Son 15-26 (Viking
Press, 1993) ("Leaving Birmingham"). Birmingham was bustling and prosperous in these
days, the third-largest city in the South. World War I perked up factory production, and
the boom continued after the war. But
lurking deep below the surface, like a latent volcano smoldering and building its
strength toward some cataclysmic day of reckoning, there was another Birmingham. Of (the] 310,000 people in the metropolitan area, 133,000 were black-the
highest percentage of blacks in any North American city of 100,000 or more.
They were the sons and daughters of slaves and sharecroppers, and even though
they were one-half of the work force, they held the most menial jobs, as domestics, yardmen, simple laborers. They lived in a thoroughly segregated society, in
scores of shaggy communities dismissed as "Niggertown," and shared not at all
in the city's periods of good fortune. In 1910, when there were 19,000 white
children in public schools and a like number of blacks, the white schools were
valued at $1,374,000, the black schools at only $81,680. To be sure, life was anything but a dream for black people in the other large southern cities, such as
Memphis, Atlanta, and New Orleans; but in Birmingham, a gritty town of muscle and very little gentility and grace, segregation was maintained with great
vigor.
6.

7.
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mark, a baseball radio broadcaster by the name of Theophilus
Eugene Conner-nicknamed "Bull" for his ability to shoot the
bull on the air-was also acquiring a reputation as a friend of the
Birmingham workingman.u Black was a populist and, although
Newman convincingly debunks any notion that he was a racist,
Black was not above making blatantly racist appeals to all-white
Protestant Birmingham juries. Defending a Protestant minister
accused of murdering a Catholic priest who had married the minister's rebellious daughter off to a Puerto Rican laborer, Black
paraded the bridegroom before the jury under Klieg lights
designed to highlight his dark complexion. Black also read from
the official KKK prayer in his summation. The jury found that
the minister had acted in self-defense.12 Black also successfully
defended a white man who, taking justice into his own hands,
avenged his brother's murder by killing a black tenant farmer
named Luke Ware on the courthouse steps moments after Ware
(astonishingly enough) was acquitted by a white jury. "[A] tear
roll[ing] down his cheek," Black invoked the ancient tradition
making it the duty of the oldest son to avenge the killing of another family member. After the verdict, Black was more prosaic.
He told his client, who had thanked God for his victory: "Don't
thank Him. Thank me. God knows you're guilty."t3
Black's reputation, and income, grew rapidly. But his sights
were set not on acquiring great wealth but on acquiring high
political office. Accordingly, Black did what almost all politically
ambitious Alabamans did in the 1920's: he joined the local
"klavern" of the KKK, the Robert E. Lee Klan No.1. The Invisible Empire was then very visible in Birmingham. The ceremony
at which Black and 1,500 others were inducted in 1923, in front of
"large flaming crosses," took place in a public park and was reported in the Birmingham News.t4 Later Black minimized his
involvement, but Newman shows that Black, in fact, was an active Klansman, an officer who initiated new members, spoke at
Klan meetings around the state in full Klan regalia, and marched
ld. at 25-26.
11. ld. at 106-07.
12. Newman, Hugo Black at 81-85 (cited in note 2).
13. Id. at 118-21.
14. Id. at 91-92. KKK initiation ceremonies
were gala family outings: whole lazy days filled with boating and picnicking and
dancing at city parks, drawing crowds as J~rge as so.~. capped as ~arkness fell
by the sight of as many as 1,750 men steppmg forward m hooded white sheets to
be publicly welcomed to the Klan in the eerie light of a burning cross. Forty
years later, their distant heirs would dynamite a black church, killing four little
girls, plunging Birmingham into a nightmare without end.
Hemphill, Leaving Birmingham at 26 (cited in note 10).
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in parades.ts Newman also demolishes Black's suggestions over
the years that he joined the Klan casually, much like one would
become a Rotarian, in order to enhance his law practice. It was,
instead, a calculated decision to get ahead politically.16 Black
had, it seems, planted himself squarely-but on his ambitions,
not his convictions.
Newman does argue, as did Black at times, that joining the
KKK was simply an unavoidable fact of Alabama politics in the
1920's.n But not all Southern politicians made the same choice
Black did. James F. Byrnes, for example, refused the invitation
of the South Carolina Klan in 1924, and as a result lost his campaign for the Senate that year.ls But Byrnes won election to the
Senate six years later, after the Klan's popularity crested and the
Depression began, and went on to become a major figure in the
Roosevelt Administration and, briefly, a colleague of Black on
the Supreme Court. Black's nearest rival in the 1926 primary,
John H. Bankhead, did not join the Klan, but was elected Alabama's second senator in 1930, defeating the Klan's candidate,
the virulently anti-Catholic J. Thomas Heftin.19 A premise of
Black's subsequent First Amendment jurisprudence was that politicians should not capitulate to the passions of the moment. Yet
that was what Black did when he joined the Klan.
With the Klan's strong backing-Black's friend, the Grand
Dragon of Alabama, was "campaign manager in everything but
name"2o-Black won a tight Democratic Senate primary in 1926.
At a Klan victory celebration, he acknowledged his debt, thanking the Grand Dragon and his fellow members "from the bottom
of a heart that is yours. "21 1\vo terms in the Senate proved him
an ardent and loyal New Dealer, who advanced economic reform
proposals more radical than the Roosevelt Administration's,
strongly supported Roosevelt's Court-packing plan, and led an
investigation into corporate lobbying practices that drew harsh
criticism, not all of it from conservatives, for its partiality and
strong-arm tactics.22
Black hardly cut a Solomonic figure. His only prior judicial
experience was an eighteen-month stint as a municipal police
15. Newman, Hugo Black at 94 (cited in note 2).
16. Id. at %-100.
17. Id. at 99-100.
18. David Robertson, Sly and Able: A Political Biography of James F. Byrnes 91-94
(Norton, 1994).
19. Newman, Hugo Black at 102, 139-40 (cited in note 2).
20. Id. at 104.
21. Id. at 116.
22. ld. at 154-61, 175-94, 209-14.
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court judge when he was in his mid-20s. But then Franklin
Roosevelt was not looking for moderation and judiciousness in
his first appointment to the Supreme Court. The President was
looking for revenge, against a Senate that had unexpectedly rebelled at his Court-packing plan. In Black, Roosevelt found "the
perfect vehicle for retaliation"23: an ideologically pure, often extreme, liberal whose membership in the Senate nonetheless assured a swift and easy confirmation by his colleagues (so swift
and easy, in fact, that Black's prior membership in the Klan did
not come up at all in the confirmation proceedings and only became a national controversy after Black was confirmed).
II

The Supreme Court was never Black's goal. The White
House was. One of Newman's most interesting revelations is
that it was a goal Black continued to pursue even after his appointment to the Court. "He never lost his desire to be president," Newman writes.24 "There was no way you could tell him
he wasn't going to be president," a journalist friend said. "He
just had it in his head. "25 According to Alabama political associates, Black agreed to go on the Court hoping it would be a steppingstone to the Presidency.26
According to Newman, Black twice nearly succeeded. Not
in 1940-memories of the KKK controversy were still too fresh
for Roosevelt seriously to consider running with Black, though
the idea was discussed and Black even told Roosevelt he was
prepared to resign from the Court.27 (Newman also reports,
mysteriously and without elaboration, that Black considered running against Roosevelt for President in 1940.28) In 1944, however, as Henry Wallace was being dumped from the Democratic
ticket, New Deal power-broker Tommy Corcoran told Black that
"[w]e've got labor and the liberals lined up for you" and that the
vice-presidential nomination "is yours if you want it." Black declined because of his wife's poor health at the time.29 Had he
decided differently and been elected Vice President, of course,
the buck would have stopped with him, not with Harry S Truman, after Roosevelt's death the following year.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

ld.
ld.
Id.
ld.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

236.
306.
309, n•.
235, n*.
306-07.

at 309.
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In 1948, at age 62, Black took one last shot. He went back
home to Alabama to discuss a possible Presidential bid with
longtime political allies. With conservatives in control of the
state party and dissatisfaction growing among Southern Democrats over the national party's emerging commitment to civil
rights, the response was uniformly negative. Black took the advice, again, Newman says, missing a golden opportunity. For according to Truman intimate Clark Clifford, Truman was having
second thoughts about running at the time and, had he known of
Black's interest, would have stepped aside.3o
Newman's account seems vastly to overstate Black's chances
in both 1944 and 1948. Roosevelt and his closest advisors (Corcoran, by that time, was not among them) did not want a Southerner on the ticket in 1944. Jimmy Byrnes, who had not joined
the Klan, was vetoed as a possible candidate because of feared
opposition from liberals and blacks.31 It hardly seems likely that
Black, given his past, would have merited greater consideration.
Black is not mentioned in David McCullough's account of the
1944 vice-presidential machinations in his recent biography of
Truman. Nor does McCullough mention Black as a possible
Presidential contender in 1948, and in fact he argues that by the
beginning of 1948 Truman was determined to run.32 (Truman
did, however, offer the vice-presidential nomination in 1948 to
Black's colleague, Justice William 0. Douglas, who turned it
down.33)
Nevertheless, Black's Presidential aspirations during his first
11 years on the Court do raise an obvious and important question: Did they exert any influence on his behavior as a Justice?
Unfortunately, it is a question that Newman does not explore.
Moreover, it is impossible from Newman's account to gauge the
seriousness of Black's ambition for national office, whether it
was a constant passion, part of his daily mental life, or a passing
fancy that struck every four years only to fade with the election
season. Some tentative observations seem fitting.
If a part of Black, during this time, was running for national
office from the Court, logically one would expect him to have
had at least three goals in mind. He ought to have wanted to
defuse any concerns among liberals about his membership in the
Klan; to compile a strong voting record in favor of labor, a pow30. Id. at 383-84.
31. David McCullough, Truman 297, 311-12 (Simon & Schuster, 1992).
32. ld. at 584-86.
33. ld. at 635, 637.
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erful Democratic constituency; and to avoid alienating the incumbent Democratic Presidents, who were best situated to offer
him a vice presidential nomination. In fact, all three tendencies
may be observed in Black's voting record and opinions during his
early years on the Court. (One also would have expected him to
keep up his political contacts, and there is evidence of this, too:
Black continued to see Roosevelt and socialize with other members of the Administration, he gave political advice, he lunched
occasionally with the Alabama congressional delegation, he was
honored by a liberal group at a huge dinner featuring much of
political and official Washington and, as World War II came to a
close, he spoke publicly about foreign policy.34 In these extrajudicial activities Black was not much different from the other
Roosevelt appointees.3s)
Soon after Black was appointed, Chief Justice Charles Evan
Hughes, to allay the public's suspicions over Black's racial views,
assigned him several cases overturning the convictions of black
defendants in the South.36 Black became the Court's "Southern
civil rights expert. "37 In 1940, he wrote for a unanimous Court in
Chambers v. Florida,3B reversing the convictions and death
sentences of four blacks who were coerced into confessing to a
crime. Although Black at first resisted the assignment, he then
poured his heart into it-"There's been no case which I put more
work in" -and produced a masterpiece.39 The protections of
due process, he declared, were "deliberately planned and inscribed for the benefit of every human being subject to our Constitution-of whatever race, creed or persuasion."40 The opinion
drew the highest praise from editorial writers across the country,
even from papers that had blasted Black for his KKK ties less
than three years before. "Any doubts about Black's commitment
to the Constitution and civil liberties were quickly stilled."41
34. Newman, Hugo Black at 303, 305-08, 333, 377-78 (cited in note 2).
35. See generally, Bruce Allen Murphy, The Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection: The
Secret Political Activities of Two Supreme Court Justices (Oxford U. Press, 1982).
36. Merlo J. Pusey, 2 Charles Evans Hughes 773-74 (MacMillian, 1951). See Pierre
v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939) (systematic exclusion of blacks from jury pools violates
equal protection clause); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) (coercing confession of
murder violates due process); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1939) (reversing conviction of
black farmhand who confessed to rape charges after being whipped by "Texas Rangers").
37. Edwin McElwain, The Business of the Supreme Court As Conducted by Chief
Justice Hughes, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 5, 18, n.21 (1949).
38. Chambers, 309 U.S. at 227.
39. Newman, Hugo Black at 281-82 (cited in note 2).
40. Chambers, 309 U.S. at 241.
41. Newman, Hugo Black at 283 (cited in note 2).
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The Flag Salute cases of the early 1940's, in which the Court
did an about-face in just three years, gave Black another opportunity to distance himself from the Klan's intolerance. Black
joined the Court's initial 8-1 decision, issued shortly before its
1940 Summer recess, which held that Jehovah's Witnesses could
be forced to salute the flag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance in
public schools.42 The decision was met with a firestorm of criticism by liberal commentators and 171 leading newspapers across
the country.43 According to a scrapbook kept by Justice Felix
Frankfurter, who authored the Court's initial decision, Justice
Douglas returned after the recess and told Frankfurter that Black
had changed his mind, because "he has been reading the papers."44 Newman charges that Frankfurter "invented" this conversation; the charge is not inherently implausible, but Newman
inexcusably provides no citation or explanation for it.45 (The
Douglas conversation is reported as a fact in last year's biography by Gerald Gunther of Judge Learned Hand.46) Whether or
not he was tailoring his views to the prevailing winds of public
opinion, Black, as well as Douglas and Justice Frank Murphy,
soon announced, in an "extraordinary public statement" in a case
that did not raise the same question, that they had changed their
position.47 The next year the Court overruled the 1940 decision,
leaving a bitter Frankfurter in dissent.48
Labor could have found no fault with Black during this time.
He consistently voted for expansive interpretations of the newly
enacted federal labor laws.49 He dissented in cases limiting the
authority of the National Labor Relations Board, not alone, but
notwithstanding the disagreement of other liberal Justices.so In a
celebrated 1945 case that came up in the midst of a national coal
strike, Black and Douglas apparently asked Murphy, who was
writing the majority opinion adopting the miners' interpretation
of the Fair Labor Standards Act, to rush preparation of the opin42. Minersville Sch. DisL v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
43. H.N. Hirsch, The Enigma of Felix Frankfuner 152-53 (Basic Books, 1981).
44. Id. at 152.
45. Newman, Hugo Black at 298 (cited in note 2).
46. Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand: The Man and the Judge 564 (Alfred A. Knopf,
1994).
47. ld. See Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 623-24 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting).
48. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642, 646 (1943).
49. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940); NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing
Ass'n, 310 U.S. 318 (1940); Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
~0. ~ee NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 265-68 (1939) (Black,
1., d1ssentmg); NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332,346 (1939) (Black, J., dissenting);
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 200-08 (1941) (Black, J., dissenting).
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ion so that it might influence ongoing negotiations between the
Government and the miners' union.s1
Union picketing frequently appeared on the Court's docket
in the 1940's. Black voted in each of five cases in the early '40s to
find such picketing protected by the First Amendment.sz At
least at the level of generality, this record does not seem consistent with Black's later refusal to extend protections to picketing,
sit-ins and other forms of protest by civil rights demonstrators in
the 1960's. "Picketing," Black wrote in one such case in 1965,
"though it may be utilized to communicate ideas, is not speech,
and therefore is not of itself protected by the First Amendment."s3 Discussing the civil rights cases, Newman explains that
Black "abhorred violence above all and would do anything in his
power to prevent even the merest possibility of its occurrence. "s4
Yet that was the same objective of a Frankfurter opinion in a
1941 decision, sustaining an injunction against union picketing
"set in a background of violence" during a labor dispute.ss Black
nonetheless dissented, finding the connection between the picketing and the violence too tenuous, and adopting as the polestar
of decision the imperative of protecting free speech, "as important to the life of our government as is the heart to the human
body."s6
The early Black was exceedingly deferential to the authority
of the Federal Government. In 1938 he was the sole dissenter
from a decision holding that the Agriculture Department failed
to accord procedural due process before fixing maximum commission rates for the sale of livestock.s7 (Justices Louis D. Brandeis and Harlan F. Stone joined the majority opinion.) In 1942
he concurred specially to emphasize that judicial review of ratefixing orders issued by the Federal Power Commission be "the
51. Newman, Hugo Black at 333-35 (cited in note 2). The case was Jewell Ridge
Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers of Am, 325 U.S. 161 (1945).
52. Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Loca/802 v. Wahl, 315 U.S. 769, 775 (1942)
(Black joining Douglas' concurrence); Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315
U.S. 722, 729 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting); Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago Local
753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 2f!7, 299 (1941) (Black, J. , dissenting); American Fed'n of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88
(1940).
53. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 578 (1965) (Black, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
54. Newman, Hugo Black at 550 (cited in note 2).
55. Milk Wagon Drivers Union, 312 U.S. at 294.
56. Id. at 302 (Black, J., dissenting). It was not until 1949 that Black sustained an
injunction against labor picketing. Giboney v. Empire Storage & lee Co., 336 U.S. 490
(1949).
57. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 22 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting).
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barest minimum" consistent with Congress' instruction to the
courts to review such orders.ss In 1944 he agreed that Congress
could validly restrict the right of a meat dealer to challenge the
constitutionality of regulations issued by the Office of Price Administration for enforcing compliance with wartime price controls.s9 (Liberals Frank Murphy and Wiley B. Rutledge
dissented.) If there was a case of major importance in which
Black disagreed with the Roosevelt Administration, Newman
does not discuss it.6o Black did not, however, typically bow to
exercises of Presidential authority throughout his career. He
wrote the Court's opinion holding that President Truman went
too far in ordering, without congressional authorization, the 1952
seizure of the nation's steel mills to prevent an industry strike
from interfering with prosecution of the Korean War.61
Moreover, in the most important civil liberties case during
Black's first few years on the Court, Black sided not with civil
rights but with the Roosevelt Administration. By a 6-3 vote, the
Court in Korematsu v. United States62 refused to find unconstitutional the uprooting of more than 100,000 persons of Japanese
descent living on the West Coast-the vast majority loyal American citizens-and their internment behind barbed wires for more
than two years. In the Chambers case Black wrote: "Under our
constitutional system, courts stand against any winds that blow as
havens of refuge for those who might otherwise suffer because
they are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because they are nonconforming victims of prejudice and public excitement. "63 But
that conviction did not extend to the Japanese minority blown
from their homes and their lives by the winds of wartime hyste58. Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 608 (1942)
(Black, J., concurring).
59. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
60. The closest is United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289 (1942), in
which Black, writing for the Court, held that the Government could not recover allegedly
unconscionable profits earned by a shipbuilding contractor during World War I. (The
Government's suit, though pressed by the Roosevelt Administration, actually was initiated in the 1920's.) Though refusing to adopt the Government's creative theories for
avoiding its contractual obligations, Black's opinion nonetheless expressed "indignation"
at war profits and declared that the opportunities war presents for profiteering "have
been too often scandalously seized." Id. at 308, 309. The opinion concluded by suggesting various ways for Congress to "meet this recurrent evil." Id. at 309. In fact, Black
said that he voted in the contractor's favor because that was "the best way to stop" the
Government from continuing with the contract system that had produced this result.
"[Black's] opinion was a letter to Congress to take action," says Newman, which Congress
subsequently did. Newman, Hugo Black at 289 (cited in note 2).
61. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
62. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
63. Chambers, 309 U.S. at 241.
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ria. Indeed, Newman writes that "Black wanted to immunize the
military completely from judicial review during wartime"
(although Black's opinion for the Court did not go so far).64
Black had already begun groping toward the absolutist, no-exceptions interpretation of the Bill of Rights which would become
his trademark and its accompanying skepticism about governmental predictions that disaster would result unless liberty was
curtailed.6s But in Korematsu, he wrote that, although legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are
immediately suspect, "[p]ressing public necessity" may nonetheless justify them66; and he accepted at face value the military's
claim that there was no alternative to this odious discrimination.
Had Black and Douglas, the Court's most reliable civil libertarians, voted differently in Korematsu, they would have changed
the outcome. Korematsu would not "lie[] about," as Justice
Robert Jackson feared in his dissent, "like a loaded weapon
ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a
plausible claim of an urgent need."67 (Thankfully, Korematsu
does not look as potent a weapon today as it did then, having
been subjected to withering attack over the years, though from
outside rather than inside the Court. A Presidential Commission
concluded in 1983 that the decision "lies overruled in the court of
history."68) Douglas in fact initially planned to dissent, but was
talked into joining the majority by Black.69 Although the position Black and Douglas took no doubt diminished their standing
in the liberal community, it seems reasonably clear that taking
the opposite position would have had worse consequences for
any future political career. A condemnation by the Court of the
Japanese-American internment program would have been a slap
in the face to President Roosevelt, who personally approved the
program; and it would have been immensely unpopular in California, an important part of the Democrats' national electoral coalition. It is impossible not to speculate that Black's and
64. Newman, Hugo Black at 316 (cited in note 2).
65. "Narrow abridgments have a way of broadening themselves," Black wrote in a
draft opinion in 1941. Newman, Hugo Black at 290, n• (cited in note 2). Courts must
"scrutinize legislation with zealous eyes whenever it is challenged as an infringement of
the rights constitutionally declared to be inviolable," he had commented on a colleague's
draft opinion. ld. at 283.
66. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
67. Id. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
68. Peter Irons, Justice at War: The Story of the Japanese American Internment Cases
372 (U. of California Press, 1983).
69. Newman, Hugo Black at 317 (cited in note 2).
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Douglas's seemingly uncharacteristic votes in Korematsu may
have been influenced by these considerations.
I do not mean to suggest by any of this that Black made
calculated decisions during his early years on the bench to jettison his personal beliefs in favor of positions that would better
serve his political ambitions. There is no evidence to sustain that
suggestion. It also bears great emphasis that Black's positions in
these cases accorded with his basic ideological and political outlook. He was a liberal; he was sincerely committed to civil liberties; he had always fought, as a private lawyer and a Senator, on
behalf of labor; he genuinely revered Roosevelt and believed in
his policies. In the Korematsu case, there was an additional factor: Black was personal friends with General John L. De Witt, the
West Coast Commander who had ordered and overseen the
evacuation programJO No doubt Black's faith in DeWitt's judgment, if not a sense of personal loyalty, colored his decisionmaking in Korematsu.
But the influence of ambition on reason is usually more subtle. It can be the puff of wind that imperceptibly pushes analysis
in one direction rather than another, the unseen pebble that tilts
the scales this way or that. It is by no means clear that Black's
presidential aspirations influenced his actions as a Supreme
Court Justice even in this limited sense. But the topic seems worthy of further inquiry in any complete assessment of his life and
legacy. Of all the many factors that tug at a judge's conscience in
deciding cases, personal political advantage should not be among
them. The Framers tried to create the most independent judiciary, one in which there would be neither "unwillingness to hazard the displeasure" of the political branches nor "too great a
disposition to consult popularity."11 Black himself reacted with
disdain to the frequent rumors identifying Douglas as a potential
presidential or vice-presidential candidate. "That Douglas then
would even think of leaving the Court to run for office upset
Black," writes Newman.72 "Once someone is appointed to this
court," Black said, "he should stay here. "73 Yet these "noble
thoughts," Newman notes, "never stilled Hugo's own political
ambitions"; the rule was one he found easier to apply to others
than to himself.74 It would be ironic indeed if the Justice who
70. ld. at 235, 313-14.
71. Federalist 78 (Hamilton) in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 464, 471
(Mentor, 1961).
72. Newman, Hugo Black at 329 (cited in note 2).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 329, 383.
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urged unyielding obedience to the intentions of the Framers departed from this most basic of their teachings in his own life on
the bench.

III
Black was appointed primarily to help stop the Court's use
of substantive due process to block implementation of the
Roosevelt Administration's economic reforms. Substantive due
process was "why I came on the Court," Black later said. "I was
against using due process to force the views of judges on the
country."7s Even before Black arrived at the Court in the Fall of
1937, however, this battle was basically over. That spring Justice
Owen Roberts, in the famous "switch in time that saved nine,"
began voting to sustain New Deal legislation.
But a new battleground soon emerged: the scope of the
Constitution's protections of personal freedoms against Government interference. As more Roosevelt appointees replaced departing conservative justices, it was a battle pitting New Dealers
against New Dealers, chiefly Black against Felix Frankfurter, exFDR Braintruster and Harvard law school professor. And
Black, ironically enough, became a champion of an expansive interpretation of the Bill of Rights to prevent the democratically
elected branches from infringing upon individual liberties in the
name of society's interests. After a mere four years on the
Court, Black's "initial doubts about the legitimacy of judicial review had almost completely evaporated."76
Many other liberals underwent a similar transformation.
What is peculiarly interesting about Black is the jurisprudential
position he advanced, and articulated so passionately, in support
of his views. Black was fully aware of the Court's significance in
American life. "You and 1," he wrote Douglas in 1941, "know
that the Court has the last word on questions of law which are
determinative of questions of public policy upon which the
course of our Republic depends."77 Yet Black's exercise of this
power was rooted in a judicial philosophy that sought to deny its
existence. To Black the Constitution spoke in absolutes. He abhorred judicial "balancing," in which the interests of society are
weighed against the interests of the individual under the circumstances of a given dispute. He read legal texts literally. When
the Framers wrote that "Congress shall make no law ... abridg75.
76.
77.

ld. at 277.
Id. at 286.
ld.
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ing the freedom of speech, or of the press," to Black that meant
no law.7s For years Black carried on his person a "dog-eared,
almost frazzled and all-marked-up copy" of the Constitution,
which he would invariably reach for in the midst of debate. ("Of
course," Newman wryly notes, "it was a prop, just for show, completely unnecessary, since he had memorized the Constitution."79) Black also decorated his textual analyses with copious
historical references to the circumstances leading to the Constitution's adoption and to the intent of the Framers.
Black's philosophy remains of special interest today because
the current Supreme Court finds itself in a similar debate between text-bound, rule-oriented formalists and advocates of a
more freewheeling judicial pragmatism. But Black's methodology has now been appropriated by more conservative judges and
scholars. In the 1980's it was Edwin Meese and Robert Bork that
proclaimed fidelity to the "original intent" of the Framers as the
only legitimate method of constitutional interpretation. If one
were to pick a jurisprudential (as opposed to an ideological) disciple of Black on the current Court, it would be Justice Antonin
Scalia. Scalia, joined by other conservative jurists, insists that the
text be the determinative guide in both constitutional and statutory interpretation. He opposes balancing with a fervor equal to
Black's and urges the Court to fashion clear and definite rules
whose application is not highly sensitive to varying factual circumstances.so Other Justices favor indeterminate standards over
bright-line rules and seek to interpret statutes and the Constitution in accordance with their perceived purpose instead of their
literal meaning. The clash between the two positions has figured
prominently in several recent decisions and excited widespread
scholarly attention.s1
At the core of both Black's absolutism and Scalia's textualism is a belief that judges need to be constrained in exercising
their judgment in deciding legal issues. To permit balancing is to
invite judges to impose their own personal views about how the
balance should be struck between competing societal values. It
is to cede too much control to unelected and unaccountable officials over the content of public policy and individual freedom.
The job of judges in a constitutional democracy should be to en78. U.S. Const., Amend. I.
79. Newman, Hugo Black at 568 (cited in note 2).
80. See generally, Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1175, 1179-85 (1989).
81. See generally, Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword:
The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22 (1992).
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force the will of others. Of course, for Black this most often
meant enforcing what he perceived as the will of the Constitution's Framers to limit governmental action, whereas for Scalia it
usually means deferring to the decisions of the democratically
elected branches of government. But the basic principle remains
the same: depriving judges of the ability to shape the contours of
our law on the basis of their personal preferences.
When people as strong-willed as Hugo Black-or, for that
matter, Antonin Scalia-present themselves as passive enforcers
of the will of others, mere conduits through which flow the currents of constitutional democracy, a hard-headed realism ought
to take hold. Scalia's biography hasn't yet been written, but
there is plenty of evidence in Black's that factors of personality
and strategy played as great a role in determining Black's philosophy as any desire to avoid imposing the will of judges, including
his own, on our law.
Absolutism came naturally to Black because he was a man
of absolutes-it was, if you will, his personal preference. Great
trial lawyers know how to project 100% certainty in the rightness
of their cause. Black was a great trial lawyer and never ceased
being one. "Try as he did," observes Newman, "he could not get
advocacy out of him-just as no one, despite every best attempt
in the world, can remove one's past."sz The constitutional history
he brought to bear "was an advocate's history: he proved too
much and ignored or swept away all doubtful evidence. "83
Throughout his career, Black lived in a world of black and
white-of heartless employers and maimed employees, of rapacious utilities and defrauded consumers. He relished a good
fight; "crusading was in his bones. "84 Before going on the Court,
Black feared that life there "would be dull. "8s From his first
Term, in which he filed lone dissents a record eight times, to his
later years, when he found himself increasingly in dissent from
the Warren Court's expansive interpretations of the Constitution,
Black made sure he would not be bored. "In dissent his creative
urge found an outlet. "86 That Black developed the provocative
philosophy he did is one of the least surprising things about him.
On a psychological level, Black's denial of the judge's role in
constitutional interpretation may have served an important function. Judges were Black's antagonists as a trial lawyer and a New
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Newman, Hugo Black at 354 (cited in note 2).
Id.
Id. at 275.
Id. at 235.
Id. at 275.
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Deal senator. Time and again Black saw the verdicts he won
before Alabama juries thrown out or cut down by the Alabama
appellate courts.s7 The District of Columbia Supreme Court
stopped his Senate committee from subpoenaing telegrams that
passed between business interests Black was attacking and a
prominent Chicago corporate law firm, a ruling Black denounced
as "malicious."88 And of course, like every liberal of his generation, Black experienced first-hand the Supreme Court's excesses
in blocking economic reform. Every bone in his body rebelled
against the notion of judicial power. His textualism and absolutism allowed him to eat his judicial activism and have it too: he
could lead a Court that fundamentally changed American society
while denying that judges were doing anything but the Framers'
bidding. Thus when asked, in a 1968 television interview, about
criticism of the Warren Court's decisions restricting police methods, Black could reply, with great sincerity if little realism: "Well,
the Court didn't do it. ... The Constitution-makers did it."s9
Nor can Black's philosophy be isolated from the internal
struggle among the Roosevelt appointees for control of the
Court. In Felix Frankfurter Black found a worthy combatant.
Frankfurter came to the Court believing he would become its intellectual leader. He underestimated both his colleagues' own intellectual powers and their determination-especially Black'sto leave their own mark on the Court's history. Gradually over
the years, Black's absolutism emerged as the antithesis of Frankfurter's thesis that judges must balance the needs of society
against individual liberties and, in all but exceptional circumstances, find the former controlling. "To no small degree," Newman notes, the two "helped to define each other and the history
of the Court during the time they served together. "90 Absolutism was a way for Black to fight Frankfurter on Black's own
terms. Frankfurter's jurisprudence depended on careful ball control and intricate zone defenses that used principles of federalism, institutional competence, and concern for the Court's
credibility as a shield against judicial activism. Black countered
with a kind of jurisprudence by slam dunk. WHAM! The authors of the Civil War Amendments intended to make all the
protections of the Bill of Rights applicable to the states, so there
was no use debating which ones were more fundamental and less
87.
88.

89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

59-60.
187-88.
585.
483.
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suited to state control than others. WHAM! The First Amendment protected speech absolutely and without exception, so
there was no use debating the strength of the state's reasons for
limiting speech in any particular instance.
Newman also observes that Black's absolutism was a "rhetorical tactic. "91 He quotes a story Black told of a Senatorial colleague who would introduce two bills-"the one he wanted
passed, and another that made the first one seem conservative."92 Black did not apply his absolutism absolutely. He read
the Constitution literally, Newman concludes, "[w]hen it served
his end."93 Black never, for example, held that the Contracts
Clause, prohibiting states from "pass[ing] any . . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts," meant any law.94 Nor was he
keen on enforcing, or even studying the origins of, the protections of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches
and seizures.9s Nor, for that matter, did the fact that the First
Amendment specifies only that "Congress shall make no law"
stop him from applying it to acts of the executive or judicial
branches infringing upon free speech. Moreover, even in those
areas Black believed to be governed by absolutes, the judicial
judgments he suppressed at one spot in the legal analysis reappeared in others. The First Amendment gives citizens an absolute right of free speech. But what is "speech"? Is wearing a
jacket inscribed with the words "Fuck the Draft," as a form of
political protest? (Black said no.96) Is showing a pornographic
movie, as a means of profit? (Black said yes.97) Is picketing?
(Black said yes,9s sort of,99 and no.loo) Black drew a line between protected speech and unprotected conduct, but differentiating between the two inevitably requires an exercise of
judgment.
91. Id. at 497.
92. ld.
93. ld.
94. See Wood v. Lovett, 313 U.S. 362, 372 (1941) (Black, J., dissenting); Indiana ex
reL Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 109 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting). But cf. El Paso v.
Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 517 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
95. Newman, Hugo Black at 371-72, 554-55 (cited in note 2).
96. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971} (Black, J., dissenting).
97. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (Black joining Douglas' concurrence).
98. Milk Wagon Drivers Union Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S.
287, 302 (1941} (Black, J., dissenting).
99. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) (Black, J., writing for
the Court}.
100. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559,578 (1965) (Black, J., concurring and dissenting).
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Attributing the grounds for judicial decisions to the will of
others is a way of divesting the judiciary of responsibility for
those decisions. If judges merely enforce the written commands
laid down by the Framers of the Constitution and the democratically elected branches of Government, they can hardly be
blamed when the outcome seems unjust, or illogical, or even contrary to the purpose of the legal text itself. They have a ready
response: "I'm just doing what those fellows there told me to
do." But that is no more accurate a description of what judges
do-what they have always done, what Black himself did, and
what they are supposed to do in our system-than Black's diffident description of himself as a hillbilly.
Indeed, the confining textualism that Black sought then and
Scalia seeks now to impose rests on an internal contradiction.
Any decision to so narrow the judge's role-to make of her a
mechanical linguist with a law degree-would itself be a very significant exercise of judgment, by judges, to change our law. It is
not supported by the texts before which the theory commands
the judge to bow. Neither the Constitution nor any statute contains what drafters of contracts call an "integration" clause, instructing the interpreter to limit herself to the words of the
document in determining its meaning. Nor is such a change supported by our legal traditions. They, in fact, point in the opposite
direction. Judges have always occupied a central role, in our
common law system, in declaring what the law is. Legislators
customarily enact vaguely worded statutes in the expectation that
the courts will put meat on their bones. The "great generalities
of the [C]onstitution," in Cardozo's phrase,101 likewise presuppose reasoned elaboration by the judiciary.
Similarly, although Black urged strict adherence to the will
of the Framers as expressed in the Constitution and their contemperaneous writings, he never made any historical showing
that the Framers themselves agreed with this jurisprudential approach. In fact, the Framers were steeped in the tradition of
English common law, which, in sharp contrast to the civil law
system, tends to treat legal problems just as Black said they
should not be treated: as "questions of reasonableness, proximity and degree."toz This same defect inheres in the "original intent" school of constitutional interpretation: There is no good
evidence that the original intent of the Framers was to bind fu101. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 17 (Yale U. Press,
1921).
102. Newman, Hugo Black at 492 (cited in note 2).
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ture generations to interpret the Constitution in accordance with
the Framers' original intent.to3
So when an American judge says he cannot go beyond the
words in front of him, he is really saying that he will not, and he
is in this sense imposing his will to shape the law. Certainly this
was true of Hugo Black. One supposes it is equally true of his
more conservative jurisprudential disciples. There is no real escape, in our legal system, from the judgment of judges declaring,
modifying, and making sense of the legal principles by which we
are governed. Our democratic traditions dictate that we recognize that reality, not obscure it in the mist of a misleading
formalism.

103.

See generally, H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original In-

tent, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 885 (1985).

